The Effect of Vertical Markets on Trade Policy Reform by McCorriston, Steve & Sheldon, Ian M.
'( . 
I 
··• 
.. 
ES0-2130 
The Effect of Vertical Markets on Trade Policy Reform 
--- .. ,,..._-:-_ 
r·----. ~~---
j , ' . 
' .. ~:· 
·~ .. 
Steve McCorriston (University of Exeter, UK) 
Ian M. Sheldon (Ohio State University) 
May 1994 
Paper prepared for NE-165 Conference on "Interactions between Public Policies and Private Strategies in the 
Food Industries", Montreal, Canada, June 26-28, 1994. This work is supported by funds from a Cooperative 
Agreement with the Economic Research Service, USDA, and Regional Research Project, NCR-182, 'The 
Organiultion and Performance of World Food Systems". 
Introduction 
Most applied policy analysis in agricultural economics typically ignores the existence of 
the food processing, distribution and retail sectors1• Of course, the existence of further links in 
the food system has received attention in the literature, but when the focus has been on policy 
issues, perfectly competitive markets have generally been assumed2• If these sectors actually 
were perfectly competitive, their exclusion would not significantly affect the welfare changes 
following policy reform, however, it is increasingly recognized that, to varying degrees, they are 
imperfectly competitive (Sutton, 1991), such that their exclusion might matter. In particular, 
there is a critical structural issue: what impact does imperfect competition at any stage of a 
multi-stage food system have on the extent to which changes in government policy affecting the 
farming/processing sectors are passed through to final consumers? 
The aim of this paper is to consider how such factors affect the outcome of trade policy 
analysis. Using a model of a multi-stage food system which accounts for the existence of 
imperfect competition at each stage of a vertical marketing system, recent reforms to the 
• 
European Community's (EC) banana import regime are examined. Emphasizing changes in 
consumer surplus, the analysis shows that ignoring market structure can exaggerate expected 
changes in consumer welfare, i.e. with imperfect competition, the marginal effects on consumer 
welfare that occur with trade policy reform are lower when markets are oligopolistic relative to 
the case where perfect competition is assumed. In addition, the distribution of changes in firms' 
profits due to policy reform varies in a vertical marketing system 
1 The literature on the impact of the GAIT Uruguay Round is fairly typical in this respect, e.g. Tyers and 
Anderson (1992). 
2 Much of the work on the farm-retail price spread h~ assumed both perfect competition and ignored 
intermediate stages of the food chain, e.g. Gardner (1975). An exception to this is Holloway (199 I). 
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The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 outlines some key institutional details on 
changes in the EC banana regime and the structure of the banana industry, providing a 
background to the rest of the paper. A simple model of a multi-stage food chain is constructed 
in Section 2 capturing a number of characteristics of imperfect markets. From this model, a 
number of propositions are established in Section 3 that have important implications for 
evaluating the benefits from trade policy reform. These propositions suggest that the welfare 
gains from trade policy reform in the food and agricultural sector may be less than current 
estimates suggest. 
A characteristic of the model used is that it can be calibrated with industry data so that 
counterfactual policy simulations can be conducted for a particular vertical marketing system. In 
Section 4 the model is calibrated to data for the European banana market which is characterized 
by the dominance of a small number of multinational firms at both the shipping and distribution 
stages, and high seller concentration at the retail level. The results indicate that a reduction in 
• 
import tariffs to the UK sector will result in less than perfect pass-through to the consumer, a 
result that is sensitive to the nature of oligopolistic competition at the various stages of the 
banana marketing system. Also, because of imperfect price transmission, downstream firms are 
shown to capture some of the benefits of policy reform. 
1. Institutional Background 
In the past year, there has been considerable discussion of the EC's banana import regime. 
Under the Lome Convention, the EC is formally obliged to ensure access to certain EC markets 
for banana exports from African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and, in doing so, ensure 
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remunerative returns. Thus, the EC banana market has been highly segmented with the ACP 
countries having preferential access to the UK, French and Spanish markets. Banana exports 
from non-ACP countries (so-called "dollar" countries) have had limited access to these markets 
due to the use of quota restrictions. In contrast, other EC countries have operated different 
policies towards banana imports. These countries have imported largely from "dollar" countries 
and have operated an array of policies ranging from tariffs in the Netherlands and Belgium to 
a completely free market regime in Germany. 
The overall effect of these policies has been to generate cross-country differences in the 
retail price of bananas (Fitzpatrick and Associates, 1990). Clearly with the advent of 1993, the 
persistence of different trade barriers and market segmentation in the EC would have been 
inconsistent with the aims of the European Single Market. Consequently, throughout much of 
1992, proposals were discussed with the aim of reforming the EC banana regime in a manner 
consistent with unrestricted trade within the EC, but at the same time maintaining remunerative 
• 
returns to ACP banana suppliers. On 17th December, 1992, following much debate, the issue was 
finally resolved: a tariff-quota scheme covering all banana imports into the EC was to be 
introduced in 1993 with the basic tariff level being 20 percent for the first two million tonnes of 
bananas with prohibitive tariffs on imports above this level (around 170 percent). 
In the course of these discussions, there has been considerable economic analysis of this 
issue, the most notable papers being by Borrell and Yang (1990, 1992), and Borrell and 
Cuthbertson (1991). These papers have used non-spatial models of the EC banana market to 
derive expected welfare changes given various EC import policy scenarios. In particular, the 
focus in these studies has been on banana exporting countries rather than production in a 
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vertically-related distribution and retailing system involving private firms. In addition, these 
studies have assumed that the EC banana market is perfectly competitive. 
However, neither assumption fits the facts. First, the sale of bananas is conducted through 
a complex, international, vertical marketing system, consisting of: plantation production (i.e. in 
Jamaica, Colombia and Ecuador); the wrapping and boxing of hands of green bananas; 
transportation via high-speed refrigerator vessels; large-scale ripening in the importing country; 
wholesale distribution and sale to final consumers through supermarket outlets. Second, various 
stages of this vertical marketing system can be characterized as imperfectly competitive. The key 
feature of the world banana export industry is the dominance of three multinational firms, United 
Brands (Chiquita), Standard Fruit (Dole), and Del Monte (see Read, 1983). Between them, these 
three firms account for 70 percent of the world market and 66 percent of the European market, 
United Brands alone accounting for 43 percent (Hallam and McCorriston, 1992). In addition, 
product differentiation through branding is a key feature of the retailing of bananas. For 
• 
example, United Brands are reported to be able to sell their Chiquita brand at a price on average 
between 30 to 40 percent higher than its unbranded bananas (European Commission, 1976). 
Further evidence of market power in the EC is given by the European Commission's 1976 ruling 
against United Brands that it abused its dominant market position, and the commencement of a 
second inquiry into the firm's activities in 1990. 
2. A Model of Vertically-Related Markets 
In this section a model of a vertical marketing system is outlined that captures the basic 
characteristics of the banana import sector. The model is kept as simple as possible in order to 
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keep the derivations tractable and the results transparent Consider the case of a two-stage 
marketing system, s = 1,2, comprised of a retail stage, s = 2, with an intermediate wholesaling 
stage s = 1, which processes/distributes an imported agricultural commodity, i.e. unripened 
bananas. Import prices are assumed to be determined exogenously, while stages s = 1,2 are 
characterized by oligopolistic market structures. The product sold to consumers is differentiated 
at the retail stage (i.e. banana branding), while the unprocessed/semi-processed product (i.e. 
ripened bananas) is assumed to be homogeneous at wholesale. 
Since the theoretical model will be used to describe multilateral reform of trade policies, 
it is assumed that semi-processed products are not tradeable, while the final product is. The 
retailing (downstream) stage is linked to the wholesaling (upstream) stage through a fixed 
proportions, constant costs technology whereby output from the upstream stage is combined with 
other retailing inputs3• For second-stage firms, who are divided into two sectors i = 1,2, the 
output relationship can be written in the following form originally suggested by Greenhut and 
Ohta (1979): 
(1) 
.. 
i = 1,2 
where <b.i and Qli are outputs of the third and second stages respectively, and <Pi is the constant 
coefficient of production, representing the share of Q1i used in production at the second stage. 
For institutional reasons, it is assumed that firms in sector i at stage one only supply the 
intermediate good to firms in sector i at stage two. (One can think of this in the banana case as 
two vertical marketing chains, one supplying ACP bananas, the other "dollar" bananas, where 
there is no trade in non-branded bananas, but trade at retail in ripened, branded bananas). In 
3 Previous work on the fann-retail price spread has assumed fixed proportions (Heien, 1980; Kinuccan and 
Forker, 1987). This is also a reasonable assumption for describing the marketing of bananas. 
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addition, it is assumed that first-stage firms exercise no monopsony power with respect to 
imports, and second-stage firms take the price of stage-one output as given, i.e. there is arms' 
length pricing. 
In order to describe the structure of demand at the second stage, a differentiated duopoly, 
similar to that adopted by Cheng (1988), Dixit (1988), and Singh and Vives (1984), is used. This 
model has the attraction that it utilizes a general conjectural variations approach so that a wide 
class of oligopolistic structures can be captured. In terms of consumer demand, other sectors of 
the economy can be regarded as a competitive numeraire so that the consumer's utility function 
is linear and separable in the numeraire. Thus income effects can be ignored and partial 
equilibrium analysis can be conducted. The representative consumer maximizes: 
(2) 2 U(Q2i) - :Ep2iQ2i 
i•l 
i = 1,2 
where Qii and p2i are the amount and price of each product respectively at the second stage, and 
U(Qii) is given by: • 
(J) U(Q2 .. Q22) = a1Q21 + ~Q22 - (b1Qi21 + b2Qi22 + 2kQ21Q22)/2 
where (3) is quadratic and concave, and the parameters '1j and bi are assumed positive. 
Maximizing expression (2) generates the inverse demand functions for product i at stage two: 
(4) 
(5) 
where b1 b2 - k2 represents the degree of product differentiation at the final stage. If b1 b2 - ki > 
0, the products are imperfect substitutes; if b1b2 - k2 = 0 the goods are perfectly substitutes; and 
if k = 0 the goods are independent. 
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On the supply side at the second stage, there are n2i symmetric-sized firms in the two 
sectors. Profits for a representative firm in each sector are given by: 
(6) 1t21 = (P21 - Pu - c21>q21 
(7) 
where Pu is the price firms at stage one charge for the semi-processed product, and c2i are other 
stage-two costs. Since there are n21 firms in each sector at the second stage, such that aggregate 
output is given by ~1 = (n21~J. the first-order conditions for profit maximization are given as: 
(8) 
(9) 
where the aggregate conjectural variations parameters V 21 are given as: 
(lO) v21 = [bl(l + (n21 - l)v211> + kn22v212J/n21 
(11) 
• 
where the v2u (i = 1,2) are the firms' conjectures about how competitors in both parts of stage 
three will respond to a change in quantities. The values for the v2ii's are continuous variables 
whose values capture a range of possibilities concerning firm behavior. For example, if firms 
play Cournot strategies, then all v2u's will equal zero; hence the value of V2; will equal b; I n21• 
For conduct more (less) competitive than Cournot, v2ii < 0 (> 0). In the limit, either v2ii = -1, the 
competitive outcome, or v21i = 1, the collusive outcome. Clearly firms can hold different 
conjectures about their competitors in the two sectors of stage three. 
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In order to conduct comparative statics exercises in this vertical system, it is necessary 
to establish the initial Nash equilibria of both stages. In the case of stage two, this is done by 
combining the inverse demand functions (4) and (5) with the first-order-conditions (8) and (9), 
to give: 
(12) 
(13) 
Turning to the first stage of the vertical chain, s = 1, the inverse (derived) demand 
functions for the upstream product from each sector, i = 1,2, of stage two, are defined by re-
arranging expressions (8) and (9). Recalling (1), we have: 
(14) 
• 
(15) 
Profits for a representative firm at stage one, in each sector, can be written as: 
(16) 
(17) 
where Pmi is the price that firms at stage one pay for the imported commodity, and Cu are other 
stage-one production costs. The latter may include the cost of any tariff imposed on the imported 
agricultural commodity. Since there are nli symmetric-sized finns in each part of stage one, such 
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that aggregate output can be given as Qli = (nliqli), the first-order conditions for profit 
maximization can be written as: 
(18) 
(19) 
where the aggregate conjectural variations parameters V 1i are given as: 
(20) 
(21) 
where V2i is as previously defined, and Vrn are the stage-one firms' conjectures about how their 
competitors will respond to a change in quantities. Note that, since no trade in intermediate 
goods has been assumed, the cross-conjectures vli; between the two sectors of stage one are not 
defined as there is no direct competition. Also, the expressions for stage-one conjectures 
incorporate the relevant terms for stage-two conjectures. The first-order conditions (18) and (19) 
• 
can now be re-written as: 
(22) 
(23) 
Utilizing the inverse demand functions (14) and (15), and the first-order conditions (22) 
and (23), and assuming <jl1 = <jl2, the initial Nash equilibria for the first stage of the system can 
be written as: 
(24) [Qll] = _1 [(b2 <P Q I::!." 12 -k 
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(25) [Pu] = [A1 i]- _1 [~21 ~12 - k 2 P12 A12 '1" kV12 
3. Vertical Markets and Trade Policy Reform 
The hypothesis that there will not be complete pass-through to consumers of changes in 
upstream prices in a vertical marketing system is not entirely new. Colman (1988) has suggested 
that perfect transmission of agricultural policy prices is unlikely to occur for several reasons, e.g. 
the form of the policy intervention, and differences between the elasticity of supply at the farm-
gate and the processing level (see Gardner, 1975). In addition, other empirical analysis suggests 
that slow transmission of changes in agricultural prices might have something to do with 
imperfectly competitive marketing intermediaries (Kinuccan and Forker, 1987). H<~wever, no 
analysis has focused explicitly on how imperfect competition might affect price transmission. 
Consider the effects of trade policy reform in the vertically-related market outlined. 
Unlike standard welfare analysis, which assumes a one-for-one change in farm and consumer 
prices (i.e. there is perfect price transmission), in this framework trade policy reform affects costs 
of the stage one firms, which subsequently reduces the costs of stage two firms, and only then 
consumer prices. The determinants of the final effect on consumer prices are stated in the 
following proposition: 
Proposition I: The degree of price change for final consumers following a 
change in import prices depends on: (i) the degree of product differentiation 
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between final goods; (ii) firm behavior at each vertical stage; and (iii) the number 
of firms at each vertical stage. 
Using (13) and (25), and focusing for convenience on prices of final goods in sector i = 1, the 
effect of a change in Pmi is given by: 
(26) 
where ~w ~li• V 2i• Vli, d, d', d", are defined as above. 
The best way to highlight the role of each of the determining parameters is to assume 
particular values for them. Take, first of all, the role of product differentiation at the second 
stage and firm behaviour at each vertical stage. Assume two extremes regarding product 
differentiation, ie. the products are perfect substitutes (d = 0) or that they are independent (k = 
0). Further, consider three types of firm behaviour (assumed to be the same at each stage): 
Cournot (v•ii• vsij = 0, v = 1,2, the number of vertical stages), behaviour more competitive than 
Cournot (vsu• vsij = -0.5), and behaviour less competitive than Cournot (v.0, vsij = 0.5). (The 
number of firms at each stage in each sector is initially set equal to two.) The degree of price 
transmission (the change in final goods' prices) is summarized in Table 14 . 
Table 1 suggests that as behaviour becomes more competitive the degree of price 
transmission increases no matter the degree of product differentiation. Thus with two vertical 
stages, and Cournot behaviour, for a one unit change in import prices, with the final goods being 
independent, consumer prices would fall by only 0.444. With more competitive behaviour, final 
4 Certain values of b1 and b2 have to be assumed. The values chosen, arbitrarily, were b1 = b2 = 0.05. When 
the goods are perfect substitutes, k also equals 0.05. 
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prices would fall by a greater extent; with v,n and vsij = -0.5, final prices fall by 0.627. However, 
the degree of pass-through is also influenced by the degree of product differentiation. Assuming 
Coumot behaviour with independent goods, a one unit reduction in price support reduces 
consumer prices by a factor of 0.444; with perfect substitutes, consumer prices would fall by a 
factor of 0.615. 
Table 1: Trade Policy Reform and Price Transmi~ion1 
Behaviour more 
competitive than Cournot 
(vii, vij = -0.5) 
Cournot behaviour 
(vii, vij = 0) 
Behaviour less 
competitive than Cournot 
(vii, vij = 0.5) 
0.790 
0.615 
0.487 
1 Two vertical stages and two finns in each sector at each stage 
0.627 
0.444 
0.327 
• 
The results in Table 1 assume that the number of firms at each sector and in each stage 
equals two. However, as the number of firms at any given stage increases, then equilibrium 
approaches the competitive outcome. Since Table 1 suggests that more competitive behaviour 
increases price transmission, one would also expect this to be true when the number of firms at 
any (or all) stage(s) increases. 
The implication of imperfect price transmission following changes in trade policy resulting 
from the vertical market structure is that the changes in consumer surplus will be lower than that 
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commonly measured by conventional analysis. Thus, for example, if import tariffs are reduced, 
then - with a vertical market structure - the increase in consumer surplus will be less than 
traditionally measured. However, as output price changes are less than proportionate to cost 
changes that trade policy reform generates, the reform will also affect firms' profits at each 
vertical stage. Thus, for example, reducing import tariffs leads to relatively lower increases in 
consumer surplus but also increases firms' profits in the intermediate stages. However, the 
change in profits will depend on the vertical stage in which the firm competes. Approximating, 
for simplicity, profits with price-costs margins, the effects of trade policy reform on firms at each 
stage is stated formally in the following proposition: 
Proposition 2: With trade policy reform, changes in price-cost margins are greater 
(less) for those firms competing in a vertical stage closest to the consumer (point 
of import). 
Focusing on prices in sector i=l, it can be noted from (13) and (25) that: 
(27) 
(28) 
where all variables are defined as above. If there is imperfect competition, and hence imperfect 
pass-through, (27) and (28) will both be less than one. This means that as costs fall, output 
prices at each vertical stage will fall, but by less than the reduction in costs, i.e. price-cost 
margins increase. However, the increase in price-cost margins will vary by vertical stage. 
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Taking (27) and (28), and rearranging, the ratio of stage-two to stage-one price changes in sector 
i=l is given as: 
(29) 
and because price transmission is less at stage two than stage one, (29) is less than 1, i.e. the 
price-cost margin at stage two increases by more than that at stage one, thus the distribution of 
the change in profits varies in a vertical marketing system. 
4. Calibration and Policy Simulation 
In order to explore the significance of accounting for market structure in trade policy 
analysis, the welfare changes resulting from the new EC banana regime were derived using a 
simulation version of the above model for the UK banana market. Prices in the UK have been 
affected by import quota restrictions on non-ACP suppliers, and have, therefore, been relatively 
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high, the tariff-equivalent of pre-1993 restrictions being 34 percent ab~_ve world market prices. 
With the new EC common external tariff of 20 percent, the tariff-equivalent differential should 
have fallen by 14 percent. Because the change in EC policy has been targeted at banana imports, 
the analysis focuses on stage one wholesaling firms who face a change in the tariff levied on the 
price of landed, unripened bananas, Pmi• i = 1,2, which is then passed on to retailers. In its 
simplest form, the non-cooperative game at stages one and two is assumed to be played by 
wholesalers and retailers of ACP bananas (Qi, s = 1,2) competing with wholesalers and retailers 
of non-ACP bananas (Qi, s = 1,2). 
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Conducting a policy simulation of this type involves calibrating the model in a manner 
similar to computable general equilibrium models~. Essentially, external values of the own-price 
elasticity,£, and the elasticity of substitution, cr, between ACP and non-ACP bananas, combined 
with observations on banana prices and quantities at the final stage of the vertical chain are 
required to solve a system of equations in order to derive values for the parameters of the 
demand system. The conjectural variations parameters for each stage are calculated directly from 
the relevant first-order conditions at each stage, given data on prices, quantities and costs. 
While this method has the advantage of only requiring a limited amount of data, it is open 
to the criticism that the results may be highly sensitive to the data used in the calibration, 
particularly the value for the elasticity of substitution. To deal with this criticism, the model was 
calibrated in the following manner: upper and lower values for the elasticity of substitution were 
chosen, and, between these bounds, values of the elasticity are assumed to be uniformly 
distributed. A random number generator (utilizing 40,000 draws) is then used to draw from this 
• 
distribution, and, as a result of this process, a distribution of outcomes for the model's parameters 
is generated, and, hence, a distribution of the pass-through and welfare effects. The results 
reported in the paper, therefore, are based on mean values. 
The model was calibrated with UK banana market data from in 1989. The data used for 
the calibration procedure are reported in Table 2. Prices and quantities for the various stages of 
the banana marketing system were taken from UK Ministry of Agriculture statistics. The price 
elasticity of demand for bananas in the UK, £, was based on similar estimates for the UK and 
other developed countries reported in studies by the World Bank (1985), Islam and Subramian 
5 This particular technique was originally pioneered by Dix.it (1987). 
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(1989), and Huang (1993). In the case of the elasticity of substitution between ACP and non-
ACP bananas, the range for CJ was set at 0.5 to 5.0. 
Table 2: Calibration Data (1989) 
Variable ACP Bananas Non-ACP Bananas 
Qi (tonnes) 316,000 104,000 
P 2i ($/tonne) 1,728 1,728 
P 1i ($/tonne) 1,039 1,081 
p mi ($/tonne) 722 638 
E 0.4 
CJ 0.5-5.0 
Source: See texl 
Table 3: Calibrated Parameters1 
Parameter ACP Bananas Non-ACP Bananas 
'1j 6048 6048 
bi 1.191"2 2.530"2 
k 5.342"3 
b1b2 - k2 1.613"6 
V2i 2.180"3 6.221·3 
vii 1.003·3 4.260"3 
1 All parameter values, except the conjectural variations. 
are based on mean values 
The results of the calibration procedure are reported in Table 3, giving mean values of 
the parameters of the inverse demand functions (4) and (5), values for the conjectural variations 
parameters at both stages of the vertical marketing system, and the mean degree of product 
17 
differentiation between ACP and non-ACP bananas. The computed values of the conjectural 
variations parameters imply the banana marketing system is less than perfectly competitive at 
each stage, with some degree of product differentiation between ACP and non-ACP bananas at 
the retailing stage. 
Given values of bi, k, and Vsi• derived from the calibration procedure, pass-through to UK 
consumers of changes in the level of banana import tariffs can be calculated from (26), and from 
this changes in consumer welfare are then derived, the results being reported in Table 4. 
Market 
Structure 
Actual 
Behavior 
Perfect 
Competition 
Table 4: Price Transmission and Welfare Changes Following 
Changes in EC Banana Regime: Effects of Market Structure1 
Degree of Change in Change in Consumer 
Pass-Through (%) Consumer Surplus Surplus as % of 
($m) Competitive Case 
P21 P22 
0.810 0.801 83.959 0.80. 
(0.809-0.811) (0. 797-0.803) (83.950-83.960) 
1.00 1.00 104.45 
(104.450-104.500) 
1 Mean values, figures in brackets are the lower and upper bounds respectively 
Ignoring imperfect competition, the degree of pass-through would be 1.00, i.e. the 14 
percent fall in tariffs in the UK banana market would be fully transmitted to consumers. This 
would result in a US $104.45m increase in surplus for consumers. However, with actual 
behavior, which is less than perfectly competitive, the degree of price transmission is less, as are 
the estimated changes in consumer surplus. Actual behavior implies a degree of pass-through 
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of 0.80, which would generate an increase in consumer surplus of US $83.959m, which is 20 
percent less than the competitive case. 
The impact on firms' profits of the trade policy reform was also simulated, the results 
being reported in Table 5. These indicate that the degree of pass-through at stage one averages 
0.92, which exceeds that at stage two of 0.86. Also, profits at stage one increase by only 
$5.324m compared to $10.605m at stage two6• These results confirm that food wholesaling and 
retailing finns capture some of the benefits of the reduction in banana import tariffs, although 
these benefits are not evenly distributed among the two stages of the vertical chain. 
Stage 2 
Stage 1 
Table 5: Price Transmission and Firms' Profits1 
Degree of 
Pass-Through (%) 
P21 P22 
0.862 0.869 
(0.862-0.863) (0.868-0.870) 
Pu P12 
0.940 0.919 
(0.940-0.941) (0.917-0.920) 
1 Mean values, figures in brackets are the lower and upper bounds respectively 
2 Profits are summed over both sectors i = 1,2. 
Change in Firms' 
Profits ($m)2 
10.605 
(10.000-li.250) 
5.324 
(5.000-5.680) 
6 It is interesting to note that, compared to consumer surplus, firms' profits seem more sensitive to the value of 
the elasticity of substitution in the calibration. 
19 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper, the effects, on policy outcomes, of vertically-related markets where there 
is imperfect competition at each stage, have been explored. Most agricultural economics analysis 
ignores vertical market linkages when assessing the effects of agricultural policy and trade 
reform. However, understanding the role of vertical market linkages is clearly important when 
focusing on processed food markets and, perhaps more critically, appreciating the significance 
of imperfect competition that often characterizes these sectors. By ignoring such characteristics, 
policy analysts are likely to over-estimate the degree to which consumer prices will change, and 
hence, the corresponding change in consumer welfare. This was highlighted with an application 
to changes in the EC banana regime, a market characterized by two main sources of supply and 
the existence of a few multinational firms. Depending on the nature of oligopolistic behavior, 
it was estimated that consumer surplus changes could be as much as 20 percent lower than 
estimates assuming perfect competition. In addition, due to imperfect pass-through, firms in the 
• 
wholesaling and retailing stages of the chain capture some of the benefits of the reduction in 
banana import tariffs, the extent depending on the stage of the marketing system. 
At this point, it is important to consider the directions in which this type of analysis could 
be extended. First, the vertical marketing system has been restricted to two stages. Although 
this was dictated in this paper by the point in the banana marketing system where policy 
intervention occurs, it is relatively easy to generalize the model to more stages. The net result 
of this is that pass-through in a vertical marketing system is inversely related to the number of 
vertical stages. 
. . ' 
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Second, while a vertical marketing system is modelled, the nature of vertical market 
linkages has been restricted to simple arms' length pricing arrangements, where there are uniform 
posted prices. In practice, rather more complex, non-linear contractual arrangements such as two-
part tariffs and exclusive dealing are often observed. For example, in the case of the banana 
market, the European Commission's 1976 ruling against Chiquita involved that firms attempt to 
use exclusive dealing arrangements with EC banana ripeners. Although these type of vertical 
restraints have not been allowed for in the model, the economic theory of such restraints would 
suggest two ways in which they might affect pass-through7• If such restraints are aimed at 
removing vertical inefficiencies such as double marginalization, they are likely to result in greater 
pass-through effects than simple linear pricing, however, if their objective is to facilitate collusion 
among downstream firms, then they may result in lower pass-through. 
The question that has been pursued in this paper is whether vertical markets and market 
structure issues matter in policy analysis? They do. Consequently, this creates an obvious 
• 
agenda for future research, particularly in terms of developing vertical m~ket models that capture 
the range of vertical contractual arrangements. Only by attempting to derive a more accurate 
representation of markets will a better perspective of the effects of policy reform emerge. 
7 See Katz (1989) for a thorough discussion of such restraints. 
• tr -· 
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